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How could naval history be of any 
value to Naval Academy midshipmen 
studying modern warfare? Not  until 
the "naval renaissance" of the 1880s 
and teachers such as Alfred Thayer 
Mahan-here, lecturing at the Nalval 
War  College-did the szihject of naval 
history begin to get its dzie 
;IV;I! I i i s rc~ry  c : ~ t ~ i < :  t o  t l i c  \Vcstcrt i  \ ~ c ~ r l c l  
w l w n  Th t t cyd i~ l cs  c l~ run i c l cc l  the sc;t I,:tl- 
tles of A r l l c n s  :1t1<l Slwrr;~;  i r  c : t t~ ic  rlr the: 
IJ.S N:lv;~l Ac ; l i l c t~ i y  o n l y  ; t l l c r  t hc  C i v i l  
W n r ,  \\,hen t h c  N ; ~ v y  uZ ;~s  rruKClit i l :  r o  
r c \ ' e r s ~  it ~) rec ip i io t ts  dcclit1c i t 1  : t l ~ l ) r a > l ) r i i t t i ~ ~ ~ x  ~ ~ c r s o t ~ t i c l ,  
ships. ;tnil poplt1;lrity I t s  i n r n r ~ l u c r i c ~ n  it1tc1 the ctllirsc <>I 
sritllies \v:is inrcgr;~l  t t ~  rhc  nrrrulltts rcstlrsccrion <>f  t l l c  N ; ~ v y  
in the 1880s I t s  ;~sst impt i t in o f  an t inquest ionct l  place in 
r l ic ct t r r ict t lum : ~ f t c r  1895 c o t d i ~ t ~ i c d  i ts value in eclucating 
r l ie  young i ncn  n ~ l i c ~  wonlr l  ~ l o n i i n : ~ t e  he  steam-cli iven hiit- 
r leship ti;tvy (11 the  i i rsr  l> ;~ I f  of the  2 0 t h  century  
In 1873,  r l i c  s:tine ye;lr ;i c o n c c r n c t l  g r o u p  I)( 11i1i':ll 
o f l i ccrs  l i )~ t i>c lcJ  t h e  I.I.S. N;tv;~l  l n s t i t t i t c  ;it t l i e  N n v ; ~ l  
Acoclcmy in A n t ~ ~ l p o l i s ,  t h e  D e p a r t m o l t  o{ Engl ish  S r t ~ d -  
ics, I- l istc~ry. ;~nd i.;~ii, ; t i l de~ l  lccrt i rcs on n ; ~ v ; ~ l  h i s to ry  ro 
the r t ! '~r-sct~~csrcr sc~ l t i encc  ,In Wcsri , rn C i v i l i r ; ~ t i o n  ; ~ r i i l  
U S  l i i s t< j r \~  rcqttirccl i t 1  r l i c  S ~ ~ t i r t l i -  ~II~LI tli ircl-cl;~ss \*c;Irs 
13111 110 a>tI1cr i1 l t~r : t r i t1 i ls  i n  rI1e c t t r r i c t ~ l ~ ~ t ~ i  \\,ere tnli~dc 
Ttr.i% xcncr ic  tcs ts  ; ~ n d  :~sce , t r l p ; t t i y t  xci,l:r;lphic: ;trl;~scs 
r c i ~ t ; t i t i c ~ l  t ~ c  l , r i t i c i l> i~ l  stlttrct! <>I r c ; ~ J i t i g  ; t s s i ~ t 1 t ~ ~ e i i t s  
I I c l r s :  1 : t r I  A Frcct l t ; l t i ,  ( ; ~ , ~ ~ e r a l  Sketch I>{ 
l l i s t o r s  ( N c i v  Y ~ l t k :  1.1 l - l ~ > l r  ;+IILI (:ot~~p;, t iy,  1874) :$11~1 
S:ttt i t tvl E l i t ~ t ,  I - f i s ~ o ~ y  of ~J IC  L I ~ ~ i t c d  St ( t~cs,  Front  1 4 9 2  
IIJ I S 7 2  (13cast(1n: Rrcwcr  ;inrl T i les to t l ,  1874) 
I:<~tlr yc:~ts l;~rcr, itnclcr r l i e  l c ;~~ l c rsh ip  of the  ~ l i s r i n ~ ~ t i s l ~ c ~ l  
i ' r<~lcssi~r J:tmcs Rttsscll Soley, t he  i l e p ; ~ r t ~ ~ ~ c n r  i ns r i t t t r c~ l  ;I 
c)tir-setllcsrct. ~ l i i r ~ I - c I : ~ s s  C<IISL. COI~II)LISCI/ <)I I 2  CTr ii)<Irc 
lccrttrcs (II the  h is tory  I I ~ '  t l ~ c  U . S .  Navy As ide i r o ~ i i  t h i s  
it lscrti<>tl, r l ie  slrttctltrc ;~nd purpilscs l l i c  l i i s rnry  of fer-  
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ing remained uncll;~ngcil: "to give tlic c;ldcts siicli ;an I-listory, for which a newly pubiislicd popular survey of U S .  
acquaintancc witli tlie history nf tlrcir own and [ ~ t l ~ c r  u~ilti. n;tval l~;~tt lcs heca~iie the tcxt: Edgar S. Maclay, A History 
tries, and of the service to which they helori~. :IS wi l l  cn- of tl~e Llnitcd Statcs Nauy, from 1775 to 189.3. 2 volumes 
able them to understand the cliaractcr ;ind dcvclop~ncnt (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1894). From 
of tlie Govcrnnient they scrvc, its relation t< r  (I~rcigii tha t  moiiicnt to tlie present, the  Naval Academy has 
states, and tlicir duties towarrl i t  as public officers "' T o  consistently offcred a course in naval history bascd o n  a 
achieve tliis end, tlie cailets were cxpcctccl to ;~cquire a rerlirircd textbook 
"ractical familiarity" wit11 14 cl;~ssic li;~ttles, s~rctcliing fr(:~n The crcation of the U S  naval history course and the 
Lade (494 B.C ) tlirougli Lissa (1866), "in ;~rlrlition to all t~doption of Maclay's book as a tcxt coincided with the 
important actions in Amcric;~n [n;iv;~ll listory "' Malianian transformation of U .S .  naval strategy and 
WIiile the cadets were busy mc~n:~riziiig tl,e details of policy-frotu frigate-hascd coastal defense and commerce- 
tlic Western World's naval lcg;~cy, Professor Soley con- raiding to battleship-backed fleet engagements-as well as 
tributed his pen to tlie U S. naval rcn;iissancc 01' tlie witli the c~ncrgencc of the United States as a major in.. 
1880s. I-le joined with an Acailc~ny colleague. G ~ m m a n .  ternational power with global political and 111ilitary.naval 
dcr Alfred Tliaycr Mahan, licad of 0idn;lncc and  Gun- ambitions. In 1895-1896 the United States became 
nery, in writing two of the tlirce volumes of Scrihncr's naval e~nbroilcd in a war-threatening dispute witli Great Britain, 
history of tlie Civil War, pub- the world's leading sea power, 
lishcd in 1883.' The deepen. over a river boundary dividing 
ing professional ant1 instiru- Venezuela and British Guiana 
tional interest in nav;iI liisr~~ry In not-very-subtle reference to 
soon manifcstcil itscll' lurrhcr the expanding caliber of the 
with the cstahiisliincnt <:I rllc rifled c;tnnon carried hy the 
Nav ;~ l  W;ir College ( lHH4), new lJ S battlesliips, Secretary ! ! 
where study o l  tllc t<)pic l i ; ~ c I  ;I of S t i ~ t e  Richard Olrrcy's 
111t1re gr : i~ i~l i~~sc  ; I I ~ C I  c l c ~ c r ~ ~ ~ i n -  prorest to l.ondon wits ilul~lrcd i 
istic ipitrl>i~sc tIi;~n ; I I  111c Ac;~d-  ;I "twenty-inch gu~i." 
I 
eniy From tllcir cspr>surc I < ,  Tlle "new navy" W;IS hungry I 
naval history tlic olficcr-stit. lor a Sight, and i t  Snund one I 
dents at the Wnr G~l l egc  were in the Spanisli-American War i 
cxpcctcd to learn "tl1;lr ilic el- (18981, the naval glory of f' 
cmcntary and h;isic jrrinciplcs which Maclay hastened to 1 i
f wnr remain uncl>;~ngc~I rcc~>ril by adding a third vol- I 
tl~rouglmut tllc many discov- ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,.,,,,,,, ume, carrying the story to 1901 
cries of new and for~nidablc ;qr- His "history , . for the pcoplc" 
pliances. . . . Thus from history Naual Acidclliy Professor lirmcs R~uscll Soky-picnacd relnained prinlary textbook 
we deduce of Ilcre later Asdstam Secretary oftlle Navy-lalcnched for the ~~~d~~~~~ naval 1,istory 
warfare which 111ust govern us a one-sctncster third-class come  of I2  Icctirres on course through the  Russo- 
to..day ."' lJ S naval history and collaborated with Mahan on Japanese War (1904-1905) and 
a tl~rec-volrr~nc aval liistory of tlie Civil War For almost two decades the Theodore Roosevelt's deploy. 
Naval Academy liesitatcd to " . . . . " "  - . . . .  ment of the Great White Fleet 
make additional cliangcs in its on an around-the-world cruise 
history courses, despite this (1907-1909).6 But a t  this time 
widening intellectual ferment, tlie concurrent construction an energetic cadre of Naval Academy instructots saw an  
of tlie "new navy" of stcan anil steel, ; ~ n d  the puhlicatioti opportunity to write tlicir own text derived from materi- 
of Malian's classic, The Influence i~ f  Sea Poiucr npon History, a15 tcstcd by use in the  classroom Guided by their 
1660-1783 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1890) department head, Commander George R. Clark, they 
Then, in 1895-1896, apparently in response to pressure published A Short History ofthe IJnitcd Statcs Navy (Balti.. 
from Secretary of tllc Navy Hilary A. I-lcrbcrt, the Super. more, ML7: Tlic Lord Baltimore Press, 1910), which im- 
intendent of the Naval Academy reviscil the history cur- mediately displaced Maclay's work as tlie text required for 
riculum radically ' I le  abolished the previously offered naval history. The new volume remained the mainstay of 
courses and substituted two one-scmestcr surveys: a fourth- tlic history curriculum covering the U S .  Navy until 1942, 
class, second-semester course on U S .  I+istory, and ail and in later editions tire book made a serious if tentative 
entirely new, one-scmcster, third..class course on U.S. Naval attempt to discuss topics other than battles.' 
i 
! 
i 
I 
Armed with their new text, the faculty in 1912-1913 L,ess well known is the intensive study accorded to jut- 
reorganized the course into a two-semester, third-class se- land a t  tlie Naval Academy from 1918 until World War 
quence on "Naval History and U.S. Navel I-iistory" For 11. In A History ofSca Power (New York: George I+. Doran 
the traditional survey of ancient and foreign naval com- Company. 1920), the principal text used in the one-se- 
bat, the professors turned to a book by an Englisli author, mester, third-class naval history course throughout the 
John  Richard I-lale: Fnmo~rs Sea Fights froin Snlninis to interwar years, Professors William 0 Srevens and Allan 
Tsmhima (Boston: Little, Brown 2nd Company, 191 I ) ,  Wcstcott conciuded of j~~t lani l :  I 
which they used from 1912 until 1919."T\vo aclditionnl 
books augrnenteci tlie reqilired reading list in 1918: [Lieu- Thus the great battle turned out to be in- ~ I ! 
tenant Commander] Cl~arles Clifford Gill, Nnual Poluer in decisive. . . . 
the War (1914-1917) (New York: George H. Doran Com- O n  tlie other hand, i f  the British had destroyecl 
pany, 1918), and Allan Westcott, ed., Mal~an on Naval the German fleet tlie victory tvould have been price- I  
Warfare: Selections iron1 the Writing of Rear Adinirnl A1ln.d less , , . Without ;I Germ:ln battle fleet, the British I 
T. Mahan (Boston, MA: L.ittle, ct>iild have forced the figlit. 
Brown and Company. 1918).Y ing almost to the very har- 
As  these hooks mnke cle:tr. hors of' the German coast- 
the focus of the teaching was bottling up every exit by 
~ rpon  naval battles and com- n barrage of mines " 
[nand of tlie sea in a Mitllnnian 
sensc. I-lale c;~ptured the spirit Wirliin tliis re;lson;~hly hnl- 
of the endeavor hy noting that nnccd concepttlal fr;lmeaork, 
"The Great  I ,  now in rn i~ l s l~ ip~ncn  were urgecl to 
progress, has witnesse~l rl1c study mustly tlie tactical ;~nr l  
putting forth of Sea Power on ;r rcclinic:~l ;tspccrs <>f J ~ t t l i ~ n ~ l ,  sucli 
scele trnexampleil in ;ill previt~us its the "V;lluc 01 forcing :tctiun 
history, , tliougli as yet there V;lli~e of toctic;ll training 
has been no rlecisive b;tttle he- Impurr;~ncc ilf  radic~ security 
tween the opposing nnvies . " and o?dio intelligence i 111 - 
T h e  "recent developments" in portnnce of com~~iunicncions and 
~11111nitrities ilnil nnv;tl nviation n;lvig;lti~n criricis~n of Jcl- 
"have intlitenceil the det;liIs of licoe's t;,ctics "" The mirl- 
tlaval warfnre, hut [they] h:~ve s l i i p ~ i ~ c n  were nu1 in\,irctl to 
not nffucte~l its great princi- contcmpl;ltc \\thy tlic rwo xrc;~t- 
ples."'" For those who wanted to esr European navies IinJ electeil 
believe iilale, the Battle of Jut- to seek supremacy at sea in terms 
land was a godsend. of dreadnoughts at the very mo- 
Almost from the moment that 
the German and British hattle emerging as a possibly decisive From 1918 to \Vf>r!d V(/ar 11, I'ro~sstlr AlLtn \Vesto?tl's fleets met on 31 May 1916, Ju t -  maritime weapon system. In- favorite-someriincs only-nnvr~l histor, cnsc sl~idy at land assumed a place alongside stead, they were offered withoi~r the Acctdeiny zuos the Ruttlc ~~{J~rtlrti~d Tltcn, in Tsusliima (1905) and liloratio criticism the erroneotls prophecy 1947,Ilc and orlter naval historians directed tlteir Nelson's victory a t  Trafalgar Admiral John R. Jellicoe made 
arlunrion to the lactics oJ W~~rfd  Wnr 11 (1805) as a formative force in in a letter to the Admiralty of 
tlie tnainstream of U .S .  naval . . . ~ .  
thinking about how navies 
should fight. As historian Edward S. Miller has ohserveil, 
in the early 20th centilry "American naval imngin;rtions 
were obsessed by the dramas of Trafalgar, Tst~sliima, and 
Jutland."" Fleet Admiral Chester W.  Nimirr's postwar re- 
mark-that the playing and replaying of Jutland at New- 
port hnd firmly cast the mold for tlie U.S. Navy's str;ltegy 
in the Central Pacific-emphasizes the imporrnnt rule the 
battle played in naval war games o f the  1920s and 1930s." 
. . " . .  19 October 1914 to the effect 
that "tlie Germans have shown 
that they rely to a very great extent on submarines, mines 
and torpetloes, and . that they will endeavor to make 
the fullest possible use of these weapons in a fleet action. 
"" Jellicoe :~nd  the other top British strategists of tlie 
World War I had totally misread the sul~marine's lethal 
(lotentinl fvr intenlicting transatlantic shipping 
From 1914 to 1918 the key to victory in tlie Atlantic 
1:ly in clefcnting German submarine attacks on Anglo-Amer- 
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ican sllipping, but midshipmen at the U S  Naval Acarl- 
ctny were not cnco~tr;tgcd to spccul;ttc on whether jut- 
I;tnd ilr antisuhm;trinc w;~rtire constitittccl t l ~ c  true il~~>ilcl 
tor iv;lrf;trc in the 20th century. This rem;~rk;lhlc misili. 
rcction of an;~lytical foctts c:>ntinttcd well into World War 
11, as was made clear hy ;I ihiglrly rcvc;~ling document t11;tt 
now reposes in the N;lval Ac;~rlctny Archives. "N.R O.T.C. 
Patnphlct No  10(;1). Outlining Glursc in N;iv;~l I-listnry 
as given at the 1J.S. Nav;tl Acatlemy" ivas prep;~rcJ by 
the Llepnrt~ncnt 111' E,nglish, 1-listory ;and Govcrnmcnt for 
Naval Acadcmy midshipmen ;tnd lor the "Second Reserve 
Officers' Training S c l l o ~ ~ l "  I~cld in Annapolis in 1942. 
Drawn from the lesson plans, guides, ;tnd bibliographies 
used in the Ac;tdcmv's naval his- 
tory courses bctwect~ 1919 a n ~ l  
1941, the comprchcnsivc "Pam- 
pl~lc t"  includcd tcsts ,  rc;tiling 
; issi~n~nenrs,  ; ~ n d  weekly icsst~n 
topics. It ; I S  very prcsent- 
r n i ~ ~ ~ l c ~ l  ;tnd c ~ l j ~ i t ~ c d  tlic in- 
structor using it to "Impress upon 
yclui mirlsl~ipmct1 tile ipr;~ctical 
\,;lI~rc ot  ir;rv;tl histr>ry, how it 
m;~y ;~nd SI~ , IL I IL I  ihclp tliclll in thc 
w;tr in \vhich rllcy will scsln pl;~y 
;I pitrt ''t' 
Fi~r  rhc cl;~sscs i,~:IcI it1 ihc: 
n,ccl;s o i  '1 Fchrit:~ry t l l r~ugh I4 
I r c  1942, I I lcsscrns ; t i l -  
<IrcsscJ ll1c I > > I \ ~ ; I I  ;~siwcts C I I  
WoriJ W;lr I .  One ,>I'tlrcsc cov- 
crccl the U S N;ti*y; iivc mcrc 
~ l c v ~ ~ t c ~ l  o J u r l ; ~ t ~ J  J ~ I L I ; I I N I  
tlicrchnc c ~ ~ n s i i t r ~ t c ~ l  the ctnc i ~ f  
ti,<: N;Iv;II Ac;~~lctny's tc;~chinl: 
t t 1 1  tile 11;tv;tl hist<~ry CIS Wc~rld 
1V;ii. I :it the \.cry itnrlncilt tlte 
classic-and, it was hoped, decisive-fleet engagement con.. 
tinued to mesmerize U.S. naval strategists. As the plan- 
ning to retake the Mariana Islands was reaching its peak 
in spring 1944, Admiral Nimitz felt cotnpelled to reassure 
Fleet Admiral Ernest J .  King that the "destruction of the 
enemy fleet is always the primary ~)bjectivc of our Naval 
forces."" A few months later, Nimitz included in his op- 
cr;ltion plan for thc invasion of Leyte Gulf in the Philip- 
pine Islands the phrase, "In case opportunity for destruc- 
tion of la] major portion of tile enemy fleet offer or can be 
crc;~ted, such dcstruction becomes the primary task."" This 
injunction caused Admiral William F Halsey, Jr., to un.. 
cover the Leytc landings and rush far to the north in hot 
pursuit of a decov la~anese  fleet 
. .. . 
I-lc reversed course on 25 Octo. 
her 1944 only when stung by a 
sllarply worded message from 
Nilnitz For the rest of llis life 
Halsey lamentcd having headed 
hack toward Leytc a t  the very 
rnoment tllat the  northern 
Japanese flcct "was exactly 42 
miles from the  nuzzles of my 16. 
inch guns. , I turned my back 
o n  the  opportunity I had 
Jrc;lmcd of since my days as a 
c;tJct [at the Naval Ac;lcle~ny] ""' 
When the tnomentous strug- 
gle in the Pacific w;~s over, a 
new generation of nitval history 
tenchers scttlcd in a t  the Naval 
Acadcmy At  least b u r  of them 
initially were naval reserve offi- 
cers on activc duty. including 
Cot~~tn; lndcr  Elmer B.  Potter, 
who s i~on emcrgcd as the dom- 
inant figure in the teaching of 
(;crtn;tn U-hc~;tts t ~ t  K;trl L)<initi naval history a t  the Naval Of tltc "new gcncr<t~ion 01 tmvi11 l~istory tcacltcrs" aftcr 
wcrc ravaging the tankers tra- Academy, a distinction he held 
World War 11, E U Potter bcca~ne d ~ e  rrnofficial dean 
versing the coast of the Carr~li- even after his retirement in 
i~fnouitl tistoriuns at the Academy, cvetu~~ally col1alir~- 
n;ls en  route fr<rtii rhc oil-pro- 
rntir~g on scvcrul tertl;, inchuling Sca Power: A Naval 
1978.'' 
ducing s t ;~ tcs  in tile Gulf o i  The task of these naval aca- 
History, tuidt Fleet Adt~lirul Chester Nitnit? Mcxico to the U.S industri;~l demicians was to interpret U.S. 
heartland in the nortlleast. This " .  . . 
inonlinatc preoccupation with 
Jut1;tniI ;tnJ tllc gr;tnd h;tttlc w;~s part of the re;Ison lor 
the U.S. Navy's lack 111 preparedness ior ;In ;~ntisuIna;t- 
rinc camp;tign of convoy ;~nd csctrrt of t;tnlicrs in rhc i)perl- 
in!: pllases of Worlil W;lr I 1  
The  Navy p;linfully rc\,ivc~l the pr;tcticc i~l'con\.crys i t ,  
time to thwart lliinitz's c~v,~st;tl ;~nrl  north Atl;tntic c;ttli- 
p;~igns of 1942 and 1943 it then turnctl its i ~ ~ o s t  active ;tt- 
tention to the w;Ir against J ; I ~ ; I ~ ,  where the search fix the 
. . . . .  naval history, especially the 
Pacific War of 1941-1945, in 
strch a way as to praise the U.S. Navy for correctly un- 
dcrstantling that the Mahanian principles of sea power dic.. 
t;ltc ;1 strategy of winning command of the sea through flcct 
cngagc~ncnts They joined with Allan Westcott, who re- 
rn;~incd ;tt tllc Acadcmy as a senior professor, in writing a 
new text tor the U S .  segment of thc course: American 
Scu Potuer Sitlcc 177.5 (Pl~iladelphia: 1.8. 1.ippincott Com- 
pany 1947)- Blandly declaring that "Jutland was a turning 
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point in the war a t  sea in World War I," Westcott and 
his younger associates eagerly turned their attention to the 
naval battles of World War 11, where they placed the tra- 
ditional emphasis on tactics." 
The  new Westcott book appeared when the U.S. Navy 
was experiencing one of its cyclical postwar nadirs. Con- 
gressional appropriations were at rock-bottom, and the Air 
Force was attempting to decimate, if not entirely elimi. 
nate, naval aviation. The Korean War (1950-1953) saved 
the day for the Navy by temporarily eliminating fiscal re- 
straints o n  military spending, and President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower (1953..1961) permitted the Navy to carve for 
its supercarriers and ballistic.missile-launching submarines 
a pertnanent place in the anti- 
Soviet strategic or nuclei~r de- 
terrent force of the Dep;lrtment 
of Defense In this more confi- 
dent environment. E B. Potter 
and his veteran colleagues wrote 
The United States arid Wr~rl~l Sea 
Pozoer (Englewood Cliffs. NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc , 1955) This 
book riveted the pedagogic fbcus 
onto World War 11 and imme. 
diately became the only recl~~irecl 
text for the one-semester, first- 
class naval history course. 
Five years later Potter, joined 
by Fleet Admiral Nimitz as the 
associate editor, compiled Sea 
Power: A Nawaf History (Engle- 
wood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Mall, 
lnc.. 1960), the  text remem. 
bered today by the majority 
of Naval Academy alumni " 
Potter and Nimitz completed 
the  metamorphosis of Pacific 
warfare into classic or mythic 
status: "The Battle for L.eyte 
Gulf was the Trafalgar of World 
War 11. Halsey and Kinkaid in 
1944, like Nelson in 1805, f i -  
nally had wiped out the Japan- 
Academy midshipmen of the early Cold War era, the great 
sea battle remained the ultimate objective. The sea-clear. 
ing Anglo-American sweep against Diinitz's U-boats, the 
bloody and tide-turning amphibioi~s landings of the At. 
lantic and Pacific the:lters, ant1 the crippling U S  suhma- 
rine intenliction of Japanese tankers and transports were 
sideshows. The center ring was reserved for the westward 
march of the carrier task forces and the annihilation of 
Japanese carrier aviation. Since Halsey personified the 
aggressive carrier commander, harsh criticism of him for I 
abandoning Kinkaid and the amphibinns at Leyte was not I 
pertnissible. Potter's monumental text thus mirrored wlXlt 
Stevens and Wesrcotr 11;ld attempted immcili;~tely arter 
Wc~rl~l  W;n I: inculcnri~~n of the 
Acknowledged as one of tile most innovative of 
the Academy Sltperintendenu, Vice Admiral James 
Calvert introduced tul~at 4uni tlten n radical notlon: that 
midshipmen be allowed to cl~oosc majors in various 
academic disciplines, a ~~olicy srill in praclicc today 
ese fleet as an effective fighting . . . .  " .  
force There would be no more 
stand-up battles a t  sea in this war."" Nor woul~l there he 
any more substantive criticism of Willk~rn F. tl;~lsey, J r  I-lv 
was indissolubly linked in victorious p;lrrnership with 
Thomas C. Kinkaid, whose amphibious forces he harl, in 
fact, left unprotected and exposed to the desperate attacks 
of the Japanese while he dashed north in quest <)fa  n;lv;tl 
Armageddon 
For Potter and his colleagues, and hence for Naval 
vie\\, r11:tr c\,cryrl~ing rhe N:l\,y 
rlocs in w;tr is subsii1i;iry to the 
climnctic hnttle for c o l ~ ~ r n ; t n ~ l  
of the  set1 Nothing Ih:lrl heen 
cl>;~ngctl hy Worlcl War 11 except 
the ntldirion of ;I fourth Irnttle 
Now the cotnposite touchstone 
was four-cornerecl: Tr:~f;~lgar-  
Tsushima-Jutland-Leyte. 
Sca Poroer: A Nnw~11 -listory re- 
mained the stantlard text until 
the mid-1980s. In the meantime, 
under Superintendent Vice Ad- 
miral James Calvert (1968- 
19721, the Academy ahandoned 
its historic uniform curriculum 
and introduced a program 
whereby midshipmen might 
major in selected academic dis- 
ciplines. Shortly thereafter, a 
new generation of professors with 
advanceti academic training in 
the field of naval history made 
their own lasting change to the 
curriculum. Too young to have 
served in the military in World 
War 11, and inspired by the de- 
sire to treat naval history as a 
subject of analytical academic in- 
. " " .  quiry much like any other suh- 
f iel~l  of history, these younger 
scl~~rl:~r..reacl~crs tr;~nsfurn~crl llc rctlttire~l "se;~ power" course 
into "Americ;ln N;IV;II Iieritnge." 
First inrro~luced in spring 1978 and gener;~lly taught t o  
f~ivrth- or third-classmen, this required one-semester course 
concentrates on I J S  n:~val history, but not inor~linarely 
on the Nnvy in Worl~l War I1 It deemphasizes the stutly 
of h:~rtles ;and tactics nnd stresses the interprer;~tion of tran- 
scendent "themes." such as the interrelntionship between 
I 28 U N I T E 1 1  S T A T E S  N A V A L  I N S T I T U T E  
The study . of , naval history enhances the readiness of today's midshipmen 
to anticipate and grapple with the profound changes facing the Navy 
they will lead into the 21 st century. 
U S national policy ;am1 nav;il sur;:tegy, the ceaseless cvo- 
lution of naval teclinology froin sails ; ~ n d  smoothbores to 
nuclear power and missiles, tlic contratlictory dcinands nf 
lcadcrship at sea and ;~sliorc, tlic itlipact of cang~cssioi~al 
attitudes on naval growth or rctrcnclimct~t, and the in- 
tractability of intcrscrvicc rivalry. Tlic instructors dcinoc.. 
ratically select a common or "core" text fbr ilic course, hut 
each co~npiles his or her own unique list of rcquirc~l sup- 
plementary readings" 
In the second semester of 1994-1995, instructor ; ~ n d  tvl;i. 
rine Corps Major Robert G h k c r  cxpcricnccd ;I ihigh rle- 
gree of si~cccss in this envirnnmcnt of creative aciidcniic 
freedom As part 11f his final cxaiiiinnrinir lie ;~skcd liis plche 
students to cornpare the n ;~v ;~ l  ihistory of the c;iriy Cold 
War with that of any o~l icr  era 1-lc ~iircctc~l rhciii r 0  11sc 
four themes as an ;~nalytical strlicturc: str;lteKy. ~i;~v;i l  lc,rccs 
;IS an instrument of foreign policy, technology, and lead- 
ership. Midshipman Rebecca M Dowling (Class of 1998) 
incisively compared the U S  Navy in World War I, World 
War 11, and the  Cold War, noting that  technological 
changes and varying strategic goals resulted in different 
patterns of operations. l ler  answer perfectly exe~nplified 
the way the study of naval liistory enhances tlie readiness 
of today's midshipmcn to anticipate and grapple with tlie 
~irofnund changes facing the Navy they will lead into the 
2 1st century. & 
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